| ID: | 31343 |
| Date: | 2005-04-22 17:04:00 |
| Origin: | 05MADRID1585 |
| Source: | Embassy Madrid |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Dunno: | |
| Destination: | This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001585 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/WE AND WHA/AND DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP (P. GRAFF) E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2015 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, SP SUBJECT: SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTRY: "TRUST US ON VENEZUELA SALE" Classified By: Charge d'Affaires J. Robert Manzanares, reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: Secretary of State for Defense (deputy minister equivalent) Francisco Pardo called a meeting with Charge April 20 to discuss Spain's plan to sell ships and planes to Venezuela. Pardo said the Zapatero government wanted to be as transparent as possible on the sale but was frustrated that "third parties" were using the sale to drive the U.S. and Spain apart. Spain is not selling corvette class vessels to Venezuela and none of the ships Spain sells will have offensive capabilities, declared Pardo. Although admitting the ships' configuration has not yet been determined, Pardo said the Spanish government deserves the United States' trust that Spain "will do the right thing." Pardo hoped the Venezuela issue would not be the focus of Defense Mininster Bono's May 3 meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld, and would not overshadow areas of strong U.S.-Spain cooperation, such as Afghanistan. End summary. 2. (C) Pardo told Charge (who was joined by defense attache and pol-miloff) he called the meeting "in the interest of transparency" and to avoid "manipulations" of information about the Venezuela sale by third parties. The Zapatero government and the defense ministry wanted to be "as clear as possible" with the U.S. on what the Venezuela sale involved and did not involve, because others, such as the opposition Popular Party, were using the Venezuela sale to "drive a wedge" between the Zapatero government and the U.S. government. Pardo said he was "very bothered" that third parties have created a problem where there shouldn't be one." 3. (C) Pardo then complained that Minister of Defense Bono had no sooner ended his appearance in Congress the day before when the Popular Party started spreading claims in the press that some of the ships Spain would be selling Venezuela would have offensive capabilities. "This would be difficult for the Popular Party to know," quipped Pardo, "since the configuration of the ships hasn't even been determined yet." In Pardo's view this illustrated how the Popular Party was using the Venezuela sale and Spain-U.S. relations for its own political purposes. Pardo said he had instructed the Navantia shipyard not do include anything in the ships' configuration that would go against the memorandum of agreement between Spain and Venezuela, including anything that could constitute offensive capability. 4. (C) Pardo then showed Charge a copy of the memorandum of agreement signed between Spain and Venezuela, pointed to the portion describing the types of ships that would be sold, and emphasized that nowhere did it mention "corvettes" as some in the Popular Party and press had claimed Spain planned to sell Venezuela. "I do not have to show you this classified document," said Pardo, "but I want us both to be absolutely clear on what we are and are not selling here." Pardo said he wanted to be clear: Spain is only contemplating selling Venezuela coastal patrol ships and oceanic patrol ships, the latter needed to patrol Venezuela's free economic zone. Spain will not be selling Venezuela corvettes. 5. (C) When asked what tonnage the ships would have, Pardo said those specifications had also not yet been determined, but the displacement would likely be between 1,200 and 1,700 tons. Defense attache noted that ships in that displacement range could be outfitted to carry missiles, regardless of whether they're called corvettes or patrol boats. Noticeably bothered, Pardo replied emphatically, "The ships will not carry missiles -- that's what I'm trying to explain. Please trust us." Pardo insisted that the Zapatero government and the defense ministry are "responsible" and will not permit the ships to carry offensive weapons. "We believe we deserve your trust," said Pardo, adding "you should listen to what we at the ministry tell you before you believe what a Spanish congressman says (referring to Popular Party critics)." 6. (C) Pardo then pointed out that "something the opposition and the press are missing" is that the industrial portion of the deal, including transport planes and ships to carry petroleum and asphalt, is worth much more than the military portion. When asked how much the military and industrial portions of the sale would be worth, Pardo demurred, saying he could not give us numbers because the have not been worked out yet, but he assured us the non-military portion was more significant than the military. 7. (C) Pardo restated his concern that third parties were succeeding in making this a bigger issue than it should be, and said he was "very frustrated" by that. Pardo claimed that many other European countries "with good relations with the U.S." were selling equipment with much more offensive capability to the Chavez government than Spain. He then said he hoped the issue would not come up in Minister Bono's May 3 meeting with SecDef Rumsfeld because "we (Spain and the U.S.) have already gotten beyond it." 8. (C) Charge explained to Pardo that the U.S. is concerned about the Venezuela sale not because "third parties" such as the Popular Party had made an issue of it, but because the U.S. believes the sale could add to Venezuela's ability to cause destabilization in the region. In addition, Spain's engagement with Venezuela, including by virtue of the sale, could also lend Chavez political visibility and legitimacy he otherwise would not have. Charge made clear the U.S. is very concerned about Chavez's non-democratic moves in his own country and his destabilizing activities in other countries of Latin America. The last thing anyone needs to do right now, explained Charge, is do something to give Chavez more political and military muscle, which seems to us exactly what Spain is doing. Charge also told Pardo it was not realistic to think the Venezuela sale would not come up in the Bono-Rumsfeld meeting. It was bound to be raised because it remains an important issue for the U.S. 9. (C) Pardo replied that although he understood the topic would come up in the meeting, he hoped it would not be main subject discussed and "the only thing the newspapers talk about afterward." The Zapatero government, he said, has made numerous gestures to show the U.S. Spain wants to improve relations, and will continue to do so, and does not feel the focus should always be on the negative aspects of the relationship, such as the Venezuela sale. "Our decisions to increase our troop presence in Afghanistan last fall, and to lead a PRT this year in western Afghanistan, were taken because we are a loyal ally of the U.S.," said Pardo. The Spanish government believes it should get some degree of recognition for such moves and hopes that the focus of the Bono-Rumsfeld meeting can be areas in which Spain and the U.S. cooperate, such as Afghanistan, and not only on problem areas like Venezuela. Pardo then said the Ministry of Defense is probably the most supportive ministry in the Spanish government of positive U.S.-Spain relations. 10. (C) Comment: Pardo made every effort to show that he was very irritated that the Venezuela sale had become such a big issue in the Spanish press, in internal Spanish politics, and in U.S.-Spain relations. The purpose of the meeting appeared to be to demonstrate this irritation and to press Charge to do what he could to exclude the Venezuela sale from the Bono-Rumsfeld agenda. Charge made clear the U.S. was troubled by the matter exclusive of the interests of any third parties, the issue would very likely come up during Bono's meeting with Rumsfeld, and the U.S. remained concerned about the sale's ability to bolster Chavez politically and militarily. MANZANARES |
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