| ID: | 208737 |
| Date: | 2009-05-26 18:25:00 |
| Origin: | 09BOGOTA1632 |
| Source: | Embassy Bogota |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Dunno: | |
| Destination: | VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHBO #1632/01 1461825 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 261825Z MAY 09 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8837 INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8921 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 2288 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 7595 RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 3685 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 8296 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY |
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001632 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2019 TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, MOPS, CO SUBJECT: POLITICIAN WITH FARC CONTACTS REACHES OUT TO EMBASSY Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer Reasons 1.4 (b and d) SUMMARY ------- 1. (C) At the urging of National Conciliation Commission official Father Dario Echeverri, Polcouns met with XXXXXXXXXXXX-- a politician who was previously authorized by the GOC to transmit messages to the FARC. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed he had no specific message for the USG, but wanted to establish a "relationship" with the Embassy. He agreed conditions are not ripe for GOC-FARC peace talks, but said FARC Secretariat member Pablo Catatumbo believes that USG participation would be key to any eventual peace process. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the FARC is trying to regain political visibility with its recent unilateral hostage releases, and dismissed the notion that FARC leaders Alfonso Cano and Mono Jojoy are rivals. End Summary. 2. (C) Polcouns met with XXXXXXXXXXXX politician XXXXXXXXXXXX at the Catholic Bishops Conference facility in Bogota on May 14. The GOC was aware of the meeting, which was organized and attended by National Conciliation Commission Secretary-General Father Dario Echeverri. XXXXXXXXXXXX said FARC Secretariat member Jorge Torres Victoria (Pablo Catatumbo), his primary FARC contact, had encouraged him to establish contact with the Embassy. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that he did not bring a message from the FARC for the USG, but said he wanted to establish a "relationship" with the Embassy that could prove useful in the future. He said Catatumbo is convinced that USG participation in any eventual peace process with the GOC would be key to success. XXXXXXXXXXXX was authorized by the GOC to transmit messages to the FARC from July 2008 until March 2009. FARC PLAYING POLITICS WITH HOSTAGES ----------------------------------- 3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said there is nothing humanitarian about the FARC's recent hostage releases. The FARC released the hostages to regain some political visibility and relieve itself of the economic and security costs incurred in holding them. Several FARC commanders have openly complained to XXXXXXXXXXXX that the hostages are a growing burden due to Colombian military pressure. He said the FARC Secretariat realizes that Uribe will never agree to a humanitarian accord, but wants to continue with the releases to maximize the political impact. Still, he felt the FARC will not free any more hostages unilaterally unless Uribe reverses his current stance and allows Senator Piedad Cordoba to participate. TIME NOT RIPE FOR PEACE TALKS ----------------------------- 4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said conditions are not ripe for GOC-FARC talks aimed at starting peace negotiations due to the on-going presidential election campaign and the deep distrust on both sides. Still, he said that at an appropriate moment in the future, a gesture from the USG to the FARC, such as allowing a representative of a U.S. non-governmental organization to accompany a meeting between the GOC and the FARC, could provide an impetus to start talks. 5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said he worked with then Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo in early 2008 to develop and implement projects targeting the rural (campesino) population in Valle de Cauca, with FARC knowledge and consent. He noted that Catatumbo had even facilitated some of the GOC's meetings with campesino leaders. XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed he worked to develop a similar project in southern Tolima, but said the effort stalled due to opposition from then Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, who argued that the project was "merely feeding the guerrillas." In contrast, Restrepo believed that working with the campesinos was a way for the GOC to build confidence and establish contact with the FARC. FARC LEADERSHIP NOT DIVIDED --------------------------- 6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX dismissed the notion that FARC Secretariat leaders Guillermo Saenz (Alfonso Cano) and Jorge Briceno (Mono Jojoy) are rivals, claiming that Jojoy, Cano and Catatumbo are good friends. XXXXXXXXXXXX observed that Jojoy lacks Cano's and Catatumbo's educational background, but said Jojoy understands that the FARC's struggle is political, not military. XXXXXXXXXXX said all three FARC leaders wanted to drop the FARC's demand for a demilitarized zone as a condition for a humanitarian exchange long before Operation Check (Jaque), but then FARC leader Marulanda had refused. 7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said Jojoy accepts Cano's leadership and supports his effort to develop a more active political strategy. He added that while Cano originally was perceived by rank-and-file FARC as an intellectual rather than a fighter, his ability to survive constant Colombian military pressure over the last year has begun to enhance his image among FARC fighters. Brownfield |
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