| ID: | 249058 |
| Date: | 2010-02-16 21:48:00 |
| Origin: | 10MANAGUA93 |
| Source: | Embassy Managua |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Dunno: | |
| Destination: | VZCZCXYZ0009 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHMU #0093/01 0472148 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O R 162148Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0678 INFO WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC |
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000093 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CEN DEPT FOR H -- PASS TO CODEL DODD PANAMA FOR CODEL DODD FROM AMBASSADOR CALLAHAN TO SENATORS DODD AND CORKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/16 TAGS: OREP, PREL, PGOV, NU SUBJECT: CODEL Dodd: Scenesetter for Nicaragua CLASSIFIED BY: Robert J. Callahan, Ambassador, Department of State, Exec; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 1. (C) Senator Dodd, Senator Corker, your visit to Nicaragua comes as we face exceptional challenges in the political environment here with a government that is suspicious and critical of the United States Government (USG), even as the Nicaraguan public remains fundamentally pro-U.S. and increasingly disillusioned with its own leaders. Troubling phenomena include: the judicial decisions permitting Ortega to run for consecutive re-election; economic uncertainty; loss of donor assistance; consolidation of party control over national and local government; and an active party-patronage system that rewards loyalty and punishes dissent and opposition. 2. (C) Your visit comes exactly one year after that of a House delegation led by HIRC Western Hemisphere Sub-Committee chair, Rep. Eliot Engel. As with Chairman Engel, we expect that your government interlocutors (in President Ortega's absence we are seeking a meeting with Vice President Jamie Morales) will give you a friendly reception. This should, however, not obscure the underlying pressures and tensions that the ruling Sandinista party increasingly brings to bear on Nicaragua's civil society, media, democracy and the institution of the military. Even the Embassy is not free from harassment. Your visit demonstrates the value we place on cooperation and the seriousness of our continuing commitment to assist the Nicaraguan people. These are messages worth repeating in your meetings. POLITICAL CONTEXT 3. (SBU) The FSLN once again controls all four branches of government -- Executive, Legislative, Judicial and Electoral. Beginning with his re-election to the Presidency in 2007 -- with only 38% of the vote and via a power-sharing agreement, known as the "pacto"(alliance) with Arnoldo Aleman, former President and now-honorary president of the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC), Daniel Ortega has now moved to consolidate political power in himself and his family. Control of all national-level government organs, combined with the FSLN's local Citizen Power Councils (CPCs), has permitted Ortega and the Sandinista party to actively restrict the ability of civil society, NGOs, the media and the opposition to exercise their civic rights. Ortega's stated goal is consecutive re-election and to remain in power beyond the end of his term in 2011. In a February 2009 speech, Ortega declared the FSLN in a "permanent campaign" against the political opposition. In October 2009, a chamber of the Supreme Court dubiously cleared a major obstacle to President Ortega's intention to run for consecutive re-election. The court declared "unconstitutional," on human rights grounds, the article of the Constitution that prohibits re-election, and applied the decision only to the FSLN. Meanwhile, Nicaragua's economy is distressed. Off-budget assistance from Venezuela has not entirely remedied the major budget shortfalls caused by reductions in donor funds after the government refused to address credible allegations of serious fraud during municipal elections in November 2008. Social services, including healthcare and education, also suffer from three rounds of budget cuts in 2009, which have allowed, however, the GON to maintain relations with the IMF, although it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to meet commitments. CONSTANT ATTACKS AGAINST NGOS, MEDIA & OPPOSITION 4. (C) Since entering office in 2007, Ortega has consolidated power across all levels of government. Perhaps the only remaining independent government institution is the professional military. The FSLN already controls the four branches of the national government through the "pacto" with the PLC. Ortega announced the creation of Citizens Power Councils (CPCs) in 2007 as a form of grassroots "direct democracy" independent of political affiliation; however, by the end of 2008, CPCs were overwhelmingly FSLN-controlled local organizations. One recent national poll showed that less than 5 percent of Nicaraguans participate in CPCs. The FSLN is actively limiting the ability of civil society and the media to exercise their civic rights. The FSLN has repeatedly called out party rank-and-file to violently confront opposition marches that are peaceful, properly permitted and critical of the government's anti-democratic actions. 5. (C) Ortega and the FSLN cannot abide dissent or criticism. Ortega has repeatedly denounced his critics -- including opposition media and politicians, civil society, ex-FSLN leaders -- as "traitors" and "agents" of the U.S. "imperialist conspiracy." Even FSLN stalwarts of the 1979 revolution who speak out, such as former Culture Minister Ernesto Cardenal, have been harassed with spurious legal cases and tax audits that seek to intimidate and silence. Opposition media has been particularly under pressure. In June and November 2009 the GON arbitrarily blocked the signal and confiscated the equipment of two different opposition radio stations. The government has expanded FSLN-owned radio, by enhancing broadcast capacity and purchasing financially-strapped independent rural stations. In January 2010, the FSLN tried to conceal the fact that it had strong-armed the owner of a rival opposition television broadcaster to sell his station to the Ortega family using Venezuelan funds. The sale places two of Nicaragua's five over-the-air broadcasters in government hands. MCC, OTHER DONOR CANCELATIONS HURT 6. (C) On June 10, 2009 the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) board announced the cancellation of approximately $62 million of USG assistance as a consequence of election fraud perpetrated by the GON during the November 2008 municipal contests. Government and FSLN party leaders, including Ortega himself, claim that the USG has interfered with Nicaragua's sovereignty and its internal affairs by asking them to account for the electoral fraud. The cancellation came after six months of diplomatic efforts to urge the GON to address the fraud. Of the five-year, $175 million MCC Compact, over $110 million had already been spent or obligated. The loss of the remaining $62 million in aid was a blow economically and politically to the Ortega government, particularly since the impact would be felt acutely in the FSLN's historical base of Leon and Chinandega. Public reaction to the MCC decision generally placed the blame on the Ortega administration. Also as a result of the November election fraud, the European Union (EU) and several European nations suspended donor assistance in the form of direct budget support, which accounted for a significant portion of Nicaragua's operating budget. This has placed other financing deals, with the World Bank, the IMF and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs), in jeopardy. The government managed to struggle through 2009, but projections for 2010 are increasingly bleak. ECONOMY LOOKS BLEAK 7. (SBU) Agriculture remains the dominant economic activity in Nicaragua, but retail and financial services, along with light manufacturing, have expanded since 2005. Lacking a large domestic market, Nicaragua depends heavily on exports for economic growth. In 2009, exports totaled approximately $2.3 billion, equivalent to 33% of GDP. Traditional exports such as coffee, meat, and sugar still lead the list, but the fastest growth has taken place in light manufacturing (apparel assembly and wiring harnesses for automobiles), food processing, seafood, and new agricultural commodities such as peanuts, sesame, melons, and onions. Tourism has become the nation's third-largest foreign exchange earner, with some 200,000 American citizens or residents traveling to Nicaragua annually. Many Nicaraguans depend upon remittances from family members working abroad in the United States and Costa Rica. In 2009, remittances totaled approximately $700 million, equivalent to about 11% of GDP. 8. (SBU) Nicaragua enjoyed robust rates of market-led economic growth from 1994-2006, but since the Ortega Administration reassumed power in 2007, increased political risk has contributing to slower growth and falling employment. President Ortega has declared his intent to implement socialism in Nicaragua, but he says that model would maintain a role for the private sector. High international petroleum prices, along with mandatory wage increases, contributed to high rates of inflation in 2007 and 2008, but in 2009 the inflation rate decreased dramatically. In 2009, as a result of the global economic crisis and domestic political factors, the economy contracted by 1%. The Nicaraguan Central Bank expects the economy will grow by 2% in 2010. According to official government sources, the unemployment rate in Nicaragua is estimated at 4.9%, but this figure does not include an estimated 65% of workers employed in the informal sector. Weak rule of law, endemic corruption, and the lack of judicial independence deter investment and undermine commercial interests. 9. (SBU) The U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) came into force between the United States and Nicaragua in 2006. The agreement has solidified the United States as Nicaragua's largest trading partner; estimated exports of Nicaraguan goods to the United States totaled $1.612 billion in 2009, while imports from the United States into Nicaragua totaled approximately $680 million. Approximately 25 wholly or partly-owned subsidiaries of U.S. companies operate in Nicaragua. The largest of these are in energy, light manufacturing, retail, financial services, and aquaculture. President Ortega's harsh rhetoric against the United States, capitalism, and free trade has had a negative effect on foreign investor attitudes and perceptions of country risk. Since President Ortega took office, Nicaragua has fallen in the World Economic Forum's Competitive Index Ranking from 95th place in 2006 to 120th in 2008. 10. (SBU) After Haiti, Nicaragua is the second-poorest nation in the hemisphere. The Ortega administration negotiated a three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2007 in order to maintain budget support from international donor countries. However, the majority of this budget support has been suspended indefinitely because of negative donor response to the massive fraud perpetrated by the FSLN in the 2008 municipal elections. As a result, the Government of Nicaragua faces large budget deficits for the foreseeable future, depriving the country of capital for much needed infrastructure improvements. The United States provided over $70 million in development and humanitarian assistance to Nicaragua in 2009 11. (SBU) According to official press releases, Venezuelan development assistance to Nicaragua since Ortega took office in 2007 has totaled more than $1 billion, including loans, grants, and foreign direct investment. The FSLN appears to have used part of this assistance to invest in party building, pay for party projects and political propaganda, and to fund the campaigns of pro-government candidates in the November 2008 municipal elections. Ortega has used ALBA funds to implement his vision of a mixed economy by investing in electricity generation, a hotel, cattle ranch, and television station; some financing is provided only to businesses that agree to export to Venezuela. Although accounting lacks transparency, the government claims funds were also used for social programs to build housing and roads, reduce hunger, and improve access to credit. FSLN-dominated CPCs are tasked with identifying participants in these programs. ATTACK ON U.S. HAITI RESPONSE: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR COOPERATION? 12. (C) In public speeches, Ortega frequently attacks the United States as an expansionist, imperial militaristic power. On January 15 in the immediate aftermath of the Haiti earthquake, Ortega accused the United States of "manipulating a drama to put U.S. troops in Haiti." Expressing concern that U.S. troops had occupied the airport and U.S. ships had surrounded the country, he claimed that this was a pretext to establish a U.S. base. He said that, "by occupying Haiti, the United States is occupying Latin America and Caribbean territory." Ortega criticized U.S. troop presence even though Nicaragua itself had also deployed 34 military search-and-rescue personnel to assist in the relief effort. The Government of Nicaragua has twice renewed this deployment and may do so again later in February. These deployed troops were trained under the U.S. Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) partnership that we have with the Central America Combined Forces (known by its Spanish acronym CFAC). CFAC-member nations have been asked to respond to the UN Peacekeeping Office call to augment the post-earthquake MINUSTAH presence in Haiti. Nicaragua told the CFAC Secretariat that it could not participate if Honduras was included. (Ortega has refused to recognize any post-Zelaya government in Tegucigalpa.) Last week, I broached this same topic with the military high command and was told that while the military wanted to participate, politically it could not do so if the CFAC response included Honduras. With some careful coordination, Nicaragua might be persuaded to deploy in support of MINUSTAH. COMMENT 13. (C) Many of the current circumstances Nicaragua faces mirror the last time the FSLN was in power in the 1980's: economic turmoil; overt efforts to consolidate one-party control over both the national and local government; active repression of civil society, independent media and the opposition; and an active FSLN propaganda machine to claim greater public support for the party and its agenda. Unlike the 1980's, however, Nicaragua has made significant economic progress since the return of democracy in 1990 and, while its political institutions are weak and easily manipulated, civil society, the Catholic Church, the media, and more serious elements of the opposition have in fact pushed back and restricted the GON's ability to pursue its authoritarian agenda. CALLAHAN |
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